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NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS
WELFARE EFFECTS OF FISCAL SUBSIDIES ON HOME
OWNERSHIP IN THE NETHERLANDS∗∗∗∗
1 INTRODUCTION
The tax treatment of owner-occupied housing has been subject to considerable
public debate in industrialised countries. Home ownership usually receives a
tax-favoured status. For instance, governments often do not tax capital gains
on houses, they tax imputed rents on houses only lightly — if they tax them
at all — and mortgage interest can sometimes be deducted from the income
tax. During the 1970s, there was a broad increase in the implicit subsidisation
of home ownership in many countries. However, during the 1980s and 1990s,
we observe a reversal in this trend in many countries, partly due to a less gen-
erous mortgage interest deduction (see e.g. Hendershott and White, 2000).
Unlike these international trends, the tax-favoured status of owner-occupied
housing in the Netherlands has risen during the past decades. In particular,
the tax on imputed rents has gradually declined in recent years, while the
mortgage interest deduction from the income tax was maintained. Figure 1
reveals that this — together with a surge in house prices — has raised the
budgetary costs associated with home ownership for the Dutch government.
Indeed, between 1995 and 2005, the foregone tax revenue associated with the
deductible interest in mortgage debt rose from 5 to 11 billion euro. At the
same time, the total revenue from the tax on imputed rents remained con-
stant at around 2 billion euro. The implicit subsidy on home ownership in The
Netherlands today is therefore generous. This holds also in an international
perspective. Figure 2 shows this on the basis of the difference between the
after-tax and pre-tax interest rate on mortgage debt. The large negative tax
wedge for the Netherlands suggests a relatively high subsidy rate on owner-
occupied housing compared to other countries.
In light of the high and rising costs of the tax-favoured treatment of
home ownership, there has been considerable debate in the Netherlands on
reforming the system. This paper assesses the current Dutch system from a
welfare-economic perspective and asks whether reducing fiscal subsidies on
owner-occupied housing can be welfare improving. We demonstrate that there
∗∗∗∗This paper draws on Van Ewijk et al. (2006), which provides a more detailed analysis of
subsidies on owner-occupied housing in the Netherlands and presents a number of scenarios for
reform, and on Jacobs (2007), which provides a model underlying the welfare-economic analysis.
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Figure 1 – Tax on rental value, mortgage interest deduction, and average house price, 1995–2011
Source: Van Ewijk et al. (2006) and projection on the basis of CPB, Economische Verkenning















Figure 2 – Tax wedge on mortgage debt: difference between after-tax and pre-tax interest rate
(Interest rates and tax rules of 1999; for The Netherlands tax rules 2001). Source: OECD, Eco-
nomic survey of The Netherlands 2004, Housing Policies, Paris 2004.
are various welfare gains, or ‘dividends’, of moving towards a more neutral
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. In particular, overconsumption of
housing can be reduced, labour market performance can be improved if the
tax burden is shifted from labour to the rents associated with housing, and
the pressure on land use will be reduced. Moreover, a more neutral tax treat-
ment of owner-occupied housing avoids distortions in asset portfolios.
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Our analysis starts with a description of the current tax treatment of home
ownership in the Netherlands and derives the implicit subsidy on home own-
ership as compared to a more neutral tax treatment. Section 3 discusses pos-
sible externalities that may justify fiscal subsidies on owner-occupied housing.
Section 4 analyses the optimal tax treatment of owner-occupied housing in
the Netherlands. Section 5 elaborates on the welfare effects of a tax reform
where the current subsidy is removed and labour taxes reduced. Section 6 dis-
cusses political economy and distributional considerations in reforming the
current system. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 FISCAL TREATMENT OF HOME OWNERSHIP IN THE NETHERLANDS
To determine the implicit subsidy on owner-occupied housing in the current
Dutch tax system, we first need to define a ‘neutral’ system that may serve as
a bench-mark. A natural bench-mark is a system which treats housing assets
in the same way as other assets. As we will discuss later, this is not necessar-
ily the optimal system; there can be reasons to tax housing assets differently
from other assets. By neutral we mean that housing assets are treated on the
same footing as other assets. Indeed, for the owner of the house, the capital
invested in the house yields an asset return that competes directly with other
assets. If we separate the owner from the resident, the asset return is deter-
mined by the rental price for housing services that is determined on the mar-
ket. For the resident, the rental price reflects the marginal utility of housing
services; for the owner, it measures the asset return. If residence and owner-
ship are in the same hands, however, there is no trade in housing services and
no explicit rental price materialises. Yet, in his role as the owner of the house,
an individual still faces the same arbitrage opportunities between investing
in the house versus investing in other assets in the market. If the govern-
ment wants to avoid distortions in the asset portfolio of households, it should
treat the implicit return on housing assets as it were a return on other assets.
Indeed, neutrality calls for the taxation of imputed rents from housing. And,
the costs of acquiring the asset should then be deductible.
In the Netherlands, most asset returns are taxed under a presumptive sys-
tem. In particular, the government presumes a 4% nominal rate of return on
the net value of assets, i.e. corrected for debt, which is then taxed at a pro-
portional rate of 30%. The presumptive return on capital income is taxed sep-
arately from labour income, which is subject to a progressive tax structure
at higher rates. A neutral treatment of owner-occupied housing would apply
this presumptive capital income tax to the imputed return on housing assets.
Hence, the value of the house minus the mortgage loan should be added to
the asset portfolio and a presumptive return of 4% should be taxed at a rate
of 30%. We define this as a neutral tax treatment of owner-occupied housing.
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The system in the Netherlands deviates from the neutral system in two
major ways. First, owner-occupied housing is not subject to the tax on cap-
ital income but to the progressive tax on labour income. Second, the net
asset return is negative on average due to the combination of a low imputed
rental rate and a full deductibility of nominal interest costs on mortgages.
The imputed rental rate in 2006 ranges only up to 0.6% of the housing value,
with a maximum of van 8 900 euro per year. The deductible nominal inter-
est on mortgage loans usually exceed 0.6%.1 Hence, home ownership creates
a tax deduction on balance, i.e. an implicit subsidy, instead of a tax liability.
As a consequence, the current system does not raise revenue, but involves a
budgetary cost to the Dutch government.
The implicit subsidy on owner-occupied housing can be measured by com-
paring the current system with the neutral system in which the own house
is treated similarly as other household investments and savings. The current
mortgage interest of 26 billion euro in 2006 is deducted against an average tax
rate of 42%. This creates a budgetary cost of approximately 11 billion euro.
The tax on the imputed rental value raises approximately 2 billion euro (see
Figure 1). Finally, there is a foregone tax payment on the net value of hous-
ing assets under the presumptive capital income tax. For a net asset value
of approximately 650 billion euro, the tax liability would be 8 billion euro.
Together, the income tax is thus responsible for a net subsidy on owner-occu-
pied housing of 11−2+8=17 billion euro, as compared to a neutral system.
Yet, the Dutch government also levies a stamp duty of 6 % on housing trans-
actions. This tax raises about 3 billion euro in 2006. Correcting for this, we
obtain a net subsidy on owner-occupied housing of 14 billion euro per year.2
We can express the fiscal subsidy as a fraction of the return on invest-
ments in owner-occupied housing, using the King-Fullerton methodology.
The imputed rental rate on owner-occupied housing can thus be obtained
from the arms-length price for explicit market transactions and reflects the
asset return at which the owner is indifferent between investing in his own
house or investing in other assets. Following Poterba (1984), we compute the
rental rate (R) as R = (r + p) + d + c − g. The imputed rental rate contains
four components, for which we give a back-of-the-envelope computation as
in Van Ewijk et al. (2006). The first term, r + p, is the ordinary return on
housing assets. It reflects the return on other assets with the same risk pro-
file. Assuming a nominal interest rate (r) of 4% and a risk premium for hous-
ing assets (p) of 3%, the normal rate of return on housing assets would be
1 Households who have no interest deduction are exempt from the tax on the presumptive
rental rate. In 2007, the imputed rental rate has been reduced from 0.6% to 0.55%.
2 Local property taxes on owner-occupied housing raise about 2 billion euro. As these can
be seen as benefit taxes, i.e. taxes to finance public services that benefit households in propor-
tion to their contributions, we ignore local taxes in the rest of our analysis (see also Poterba,
1992).
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7%. The second term, d, reflects depreciation. It is set at 0.4% of the value
of the house. The third term, c, reflects annual costs of maintenance (0.9%),
insurance (0.1%) and transaction costs (0.3%). Together, these costs add up to
1.3%. Finally, we subtract the capital gains due to the rise in housing prices,
g. It is set at 3%. The imputed rental rate therefore equals 5.7%. This comes
close to rental rates observed in the free rental market in the Netherlands (see
Van Ewijk et al. (2006)). In 2006, the gross asset value of the owner-occupied
housing stock is estimated at 1150 billion euro. At an imputed rental rate of
5.7%, it leads to a total rental value of 66.5 billion euro. The implicit subsidy
of 14 billion euro thus amounts to approximately 20% of the implicit price of
owner-occupied housing. Put differently, the net subsidy reduces the user cost
for the home owner from 5.7% of the housing value to 4.5%.
3 EXTERNALITIES FROM HOME OWNERSHIP
What can be reasons for the government to subsidise owner-occupied hous-
ing? One argument can be positive externalities. For instance, homeowners
may invest more in the maintenance of their house and garden than tenants,
house owners may support local schools more, and they might be better in
child rearing. This generates externalities if not only the owners benefit (i.e.
those who bear the cost of these activities) but also the others in the neigh-
bourhood. If tenants do not take these positive spillovers into account, there
would be underinvestment in house maintenance, school support and child
rearing. The government may internalise these externalities by stimulating
owner-occupied housing through subsidies.
A number of empirical studies investigate externalities of owner-occupied
housing. Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) find that positive neighbourhood effects
from house maintenance are statistically significant in the US, albeit small
in economic terms. Hendershott and White (2000) discuss several studies for
the US reporting significant positive effects of home ownership on children’s
cognitive and behavioural outcomes. The problem with these studies is that
the estimates may suffer from selection biases and endogeneity problems. It
is indeed difficult to control for other household characteristics that are cor-
related with home ownership and also affect child outcomes.3
While positive externalities may justify subsidies on owner-occupied hous-
ing, Oswald (1996) argues that home ownership also causes negative external-
ities. In particular, homeowners are less mobile than tenants and, therefore,
less willing to move to jobs when they become unemployed. Indeed, a 10%-
point increase in home ownership leads to a 2%-point increase in aggregate
3 If the government aims to stimulate home ownership as such, there is no reason to link
the subsidy to interest payments on mortgage loans. Rather, a transfer conditional on home
ownership would be better targeted on the goal of stimulating ownership.
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unemployment. This would justify a tax, rather than a subsidy on home own-
ership.
Whether we should subsidise home ownership also depends on subsidies
on rental housing. In the Netherlands, the social housing sector is heavily
regulated through means-tested rent assistance and rent controls, which push
rents below market rates. The total amount of explicit and implicit (rent con-
trols) subsidies on publicly controlled rental housing are of similar size as
the subsidies for the owner-occupied housing (Ter Rele and Van der Steen
(2001)). This could explain why home ownership in the Netherlands is rela-
tively small compared to other countries and why a free rental market is vir-
tually absent. Higher income groups may be locked in the rental sector due
to the caps on rental rates. Subsidies on owner-occupied housing may then be
seen as an indirect instrument to offset distortions induced by rent assistance
and rent controls. These distortions can be fought more directly, however, by
removing them with reforms in social housing, rather than by introducing
distortions in purchase of owner-occupied housing. Moreover, rent assistance
only applies to people with low incomes, because higher incomes are usually
not eligible to rent assistance.
On balance, the literature on externalities does not provide strong argu-
ments for fiscal subsidies on owner-occupied housing. We therefore proceed
in the next section by ignoring externalities.
4 OPTIMAL POSITIVE TAX ON HOUSING
A partial equilibrium analysis of the housing market is insufficient to under-
stand the welfare implications of housing subsidies. Subsidies on housing
boost the demand for housing services and raise housing prices if the elastic-
ity of supply is less than infinite. This may affect other markets as well. For
instance, housing subsidies can affect the labour market. Moreover, if they
are financed by distorting income taxes, this depresses labour supply. Hous-
ing subsidies can also influence capital markets by distorting the asset portfo-
lio between housing and other assets or by affecting saving decisions. Finally,
housing subsidies put pressure on the use of land, which is scarce in the Neth-
erlands.
To understand the full welfare impact of housing subsidies, we need a gen-
eral equilibrium perspective where labour markets and saving decisions are
jointly analysed with the housing market. This section discusses such a gen-
eral equilibrium perspective (see Jacobs (2007), for a formalisation of some
aspects). We abstract from a number of complications to keep track on the
key interactions between markets. Moreover, we focus on those interactions
that are relevant as they may yield first order welfare effects. We assume —
otherwise — perfect housing and labour markets, and ignore externalities or
non-separabilities that may justify subsidies or taxes on housing in a sec-
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ond-best setting with existing labour and capital-market distortions.4 More-
over, we assume a small open economy in which the international capital
market fixes the real interest rate. Consequently, there are no general equilib-
rium repercussions of the fiscal treatment of housing on the real interest rate.
Labour is immobile internationally.
Special to the housing market is that there can be land and location rents
due to limited supply of land or location-specific factors. Hence, land and
location are similar to a fixed factor in the production of housing. Rents from
land and location end up in housing prices (Ricardo, 1817). The government
uses distorting tax instruments to raise revenues so as to finance public goods.
The government will seek the combination of labour taxes, capital income
taxes, and housing taxes/subsidies to minimize the deadweight loss of meeting
the government revenue requirement. How does the optimal tax treatment of
housing look like in this second-best world?
To answer this question we first make an assumption regarding the desir-
ability of capital income taxation. For reasons that are beyond the scope of
this paper, we assume that the optimal capital tax is positive.5 The optimal
structure of labour and capital taxes strikes a balance between labour mar-
ket distortions and saving distortions. The more capital (labour) responds to
higher taxes, the higher (lower) will be labour taxes relative to capital income
taxes. Under normal conditions, positive labour and capital income taxes are
optimal.
The optimal tax/subsidy on housing will depend on land or location rents
in housing. Under a perfectly elastic housing supply, these land or location
rents are zero. In that case, the optimal housing subsidies are zero as long as
we assume that externalities are absent and housing is equally complementary
to leisure as ordinary consumption goods. In that case, there are no efficiency
reasons to differentiate between housing and other consumption. A uniform
consumption tax (or equivalent: a labour income tax) would minimise distor-
tions in labour supply. Housing subsidies (taxes) would only create distortions
by causing suboptimally high (low) consumption of housing.6
If housing supply is less than perfectly elastic, e.g. due to limited availabil-
ity of land or locations, there are pure rents associated with housing. It will
4 More specifically, household preferences are required to be weakly separable between hous-
ing consumption and leisure demand. If housing consumption is more complementary to
leisure than other consumption, the government wishes to tax housing so as to reduce to tax
burden on labour effort (and vice versa), see e.g. Corlett and Hague (1953).
5 See e.g. Gordon (2000) for a review of arguments for capital income taxation. Portfolio
distortions with human capital accumulation due to the presence of labour income taxes also
render a positive capital tax optimal (Jacobs and Bovenberg (2007)).
6 Newly constructed houses are subject to value-added taxes. These are a one-off tax on the
flow of services provided by housing assets. The value-added tax is therefore neutral between
housing and other consumption, which is also subject to tax.
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then be optimal to tax housing services so as to implicitly tax the rents from
land and location. This policy helps to reduce the distortions associated with
taxes on labour and capital. With a completely inelastic supply of housing,
the housing tax will not distort the allocation between housing and other con-
sumption as the consumer price of housing is unaffected by the tax. Hous-
ing taxes are therefore lump-sum taxes that create no distortions. However, as
long as the elasticity of housing supply is positive, the housing tax will distort
the consumption package of goods and housing services by raising the price
of housing consumption. In that case, the government will optimally strike
a balance between, on the one hand, impose a tax on location-specific rents
and, on the other hand, minimize distortions in the mix between housing and
other consumption. Irrespective of the magnitude of the housing supply elas-
ticity, however, it is optimal to impose a tax on housing, not a subsidy.
Ideally, the government taxes land rents directly through appropriate tar-
geted instruments. Then, the government does not need to introduce second-
best instruments, which distort the allocation of consumption. Indeed, if the
government has sufficient information to implement taxes on land or location
rents directly, the case for a housing tax is lost. Unfortunately, capturing the
rents by specific taxes is not an easy task. For instance, rents vary across loca-
tions, e.g. being high in urban areas and low in the periphery. If direct instru-
ments are not available to tax location-specific rents, taxes on housing are sec-
ond-best instruments to indirectly tax land and location rents.
There is another distortion that requires attention: investment in housing.
Housing supply may be particularly inelastic in the short run when house
owners have made irreversible investments. The housing tax thus not only
imposes a tax on land rents, but also involves a one-off levy on the exist-
ing capital stock. This is non-distortionary only if it does affect the credibil-
ity of government policy. If not, it will lead to the familiar time-inconsistency
problem of capital taxation and distort investment in housing. With respect to
new investment in housing, the tax system should optimally avoid distortions
in asset allocation. From a buyer’s perspective, a house represents an invest-
ment with a long time horizon. Indeed, houses make up a considerable part
of household’s asset portfolios. In principle, the returns to these investments
should be taxed at the same rate as ordinary assets to avoid asset substitution
in household portfolios. Large asset substitution would erode the tax base of
the capital income tax.7 Moreover, the tax on housing capital will avoid dis-
tortions in saving decisions as long as a positive tax on capital income is part
of the optimal tax structure. Hence, the optimal tax treatment of new housing
capital is identical to that of ordinary savings.
7 Mandatory pension saving, liquidity constraints, and investments in human capital will
cause less than perfect asset substitution in actual household portfolios.
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5 REFORM TOWARDS A NEUTRAL TAXATION OF HOUSING
In the current situation in the Netherlands, housing is subsidized, not taxed.
Reducing this subsidy and recycling the revenue in the form of lower labour
taxes may yield a double dividend by reducing allocation distortions in con-
sumption and mitigating labour market distortions. This section discusses a
shift towards a neutral system whereby the subsidy on housing is abolished.
To understand the welfare effects of the reform, first consider the case in
which there are no land rents associated with housing supply. This occurs
if the elasticity of housing supply is infinite. Overconsumption of housing
is eliminated by the reform, which yields a direct welfare gain, i.e. a hous-
ing dividend. With a perfectly elastic supply of housing, the reform does not
yield a second dividend, i.e. on the labour market. The reason is that a hous-
ing subsidy and a lower income tax yield equivalent effects on labour supply.
We therefore concentrate on the housing dividend.8 Following Poterba (1992),
we compute the welfare costs of the housing subsidy by means of the dead-
weight loss (DWL), expressed in terms of the subsidy: DWL = 1/2 ε t, where
ε reflects the compensated demand elasticity for housing and t stands for the
subsidy in terms of the consumer price of housing services. Poterba (1992)
adopts an elasticity of −0.8 based on estimates for the United States. The
elasticity is conditional on home ownership, i.e. it does not capture the dis-
tortion between home ownership and renting. Using a subsidy rate of 0.2 and
an elasticity of −0.75, we arrive at a deadweight loss of 7.5% of the subsidy.
Given a total subsidy of 14 billion euro, this boils down to a welfare cost of
around 1 billion euro due to overconsumption of housing.
As a second case, consider inelastic supply of housing. Now, housing cre-
ates land and location rents that are capitalized in housing prices. These can
efficiently be taxed away. Eliminating the subsidy on the location rents will
therefore enhance the efficiency of the tax mix. Indeed, as the revenues from
lower housing subsidies are used for lower tax rates on labour, this stimulates
employment as households substitute consumption for leisure. The impact
depends on the compensated elasticity of labour supply (since there is no
income effect as long as the reform is budgetary neutral). A meta-analysis of
the empirical literature by Evers et al. (2005) suggests that the uncompensated
elasticity of labour supply is approximately 0.1 on average for men and 0.5
on average for women. Income effects are usually small, so that the compen-
sated elasticities only slightly exceed these values. We take an average value
for the compensated labour supply elasticity of 1/3. With a housing subsidy
in the Netherlands of 14 billion euro, Dutch income tax rates can be cut by
6%-points, thereby leaving the public budget balanced. It would raise labour
8 We assume that land is properly priced (reflecting the cost of alternative uses), so that there
is no first order welfare effect in the land market.
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supply by 1/3×6=2%. The extra employment will raise GDP in the Nether-
lands by a similar amount.9 To determine the welfare effects of this rise in
output, we should correct for the decline in leisure. The welfare gain from
an extra hour of work can be measured by the tax wedge, i.e. the difference
between labour costs for employers (measuring the value of extra production)
and the after-tax real wage for the employee (measuring the value of fore-
gone leisure). Assuming a tax wedge of direct and indirect taxes of 60% in the
Netherlands (a direct tax of 40% and an indirect tax of 20%), the welfare gain
would be 0.6× 2%= 1.2% of GDP. Thus, assuming perfectly inelastic hous-
ing supply, eliminating the fiscal subsidy on housing and using the receipts to
lower labour income taxes, increases welfare by 6 billion euro in 2006.
The elasticity of housing supply plays a crucial role for the welfare effects
of lower housing subsidies. The first welfare dividend in housing consump-
tion rises in the elasticity of housing supply and is zero if the elasticity is
zero; the second welfare dividend in the labour market falls in the elasticity
of housing supply and is zero if the elasticity is infinite. For a housing supply
elasticity between zero and infinity, there will always be a double dividend,
i.e. welfare improves on account of smaller distortions in the housing market
and smaller distortions in the labour market. Empirical studies that directly
estimate housing supply elasticities report a rather large spread. For instance,
Harter-Dreiman (2004) finds an elasticity in urban areas between 1 and 2, but
a value between 2½ and 4½ in rural areas in the US. For the UK, Meen
(2001) argues that elasticities are typically smaller, usually below 1. Swank et
al. (2002) find that the elasticity of housing supply in the Netherlands is also
relatively small, probably due to a strict policy regarding the use of land for
construction purposes. Berger et al. (2000) and Capozza et al. (1999) find that
subsidies on owner-occupied housing get fully capitalised in land prices, at
least in urban areas, which also suggests that housing supply is inelastic. If
this is true, the second dividend associated with the labour market will pri-
marily determine the welfare benefit from smaller housing subsidies.
The labour market may also be affected by the transaction tax on houses.
Indeed, the negative externalities emphasised by Oswald (1996) are due to the
reduced mobility of homeowners. The transaction tax reinforces these effects
on unemployment by further reducing household mobility. Moreover, there
is a direct deadweight loss associated with reduced residential mobility. Van
Ommeren and Van Leuvenstein (2005), for instance, report negative effects of
the transaction tax on the number of transactions by existing homeowners.
The transaction tax thus causes a deadweight loss: using the elasticity of 8
9 In a small open economy, the capital stock will immediately start to increase in response
to the larger supply of labour so as to prevent the real return on capital falling below world
levels. With constant returns to scale in production, output therefore expands at the same rate
as labour supply.
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reported by Van Ommeren and Van Leuvenstein and a tax rate of 6%, the
deadweight loss equals 1/2× 8× 6%= 24% of the revenue of the transaction
tax. This is approximately 0.7 billion euro.10
Besides potential dividends in housing and labour markets, a third dividend
occurs when distortions in asset portfolios are reduced. This holds irrespec-
tive of the supply elasticity in the housing market. A distorted asset allocation
with too high levels of debt will lead to a higher than optimal risk exposure
for households, which involves a welfare cost. A quantitative analysis of this
distortion would require the modelling of the risk-return trade-off, which is
beyond the scope of this paper.
6 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM
Although a reform of the tax-favoured treatment of home ownership in the
Netherlands towards a neutral system is expected to deliver aggregate welfare
gains, it may be hard to implement such a reform due to political constraints.
The effective fiscal subsidy for every household depends on the amount of
debt as a share of the housing value, the type of mortgage loan, the interest
rate, and the marginal tax against which the mortgage interest is deducted.
Due the large dispersion in home ownership, mortgage debt and income lev-
els across households, there will be many winners and losers from any type
of reform. Reform packages should address these issues. Although compensa-
tion in the case of subsidy reform might in principle be possible, the multidi-
mensional character of the dispersion of the income effects makes it generally
impossible to avoid groups of households suffering losses.
A gradual introduction might help to mitigate large income effects. How-
ever, also future reforms will be immediately capitalised in current house
prices because people will anticipate future policy changes in the housing
market. Only a very gradual introduction may avoid a significant reduction
in prices. For instance, the UK has gradually phased out its housing subsidies
between 1974 and 1999. In 1974, it introduced a fixed nominal ceiling for tax
deductible mortgage debts. The value of the ceiling was gradually reduced by
inflation and in 1999 the mortgage interest tax relief was abolished.
Another option to smooth the distributional effects is by making a distinc-
tion between ‘old’ and ‘new’ cases. It avoids the double hit of the abolishment
of housing subsidies for current owners, i.e. the direct loss of subsidies in their
income and the indirect loss through the fall in the value of their property. If
only entrants would fall under the new regime, the direct effect is reduced for
existing home owners.
10 O’sullivan et al. (1995) report that the welfare costs of a tax on housing transactions is
always larger than a tax on home ownership.
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Alternatively, a new fiscal regime could be made contingent on the amount
of residual debt, i.e. the (new) housing value minus the (old) mortgage debt.
This would insulate homeowners with large debts and no assets. Falling house
prices can be absorbed more easy by homeowners with small debts and large
capital gains on their homes. Indeed, an exemption based on residual debt
will accomplish this.
Yet another way to confine the distributional effects is to reform at the
same time the social housing sector. Such a comprehensive reform of hous-
ing policies would raise the opportunities for compensation and introduces
options for feasible package deals. Simultaneous reform in all segments of the
housing market would also magnify the welfare effects as it would also elim-
inate distortions caused by social rental policies.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper assesses the welfare effects of the current tax-favoured treatment
of home ownership in the Netherlands. We compare the current system with
a neutral system of owner-occupied housing and estimate the current average
subsidy at 20% of the imputed rental value of the house. The literature does
not offer strong support for subsidies on the basis of positive external effects
from home ownership and some studies even point to negative externalities.
On the contrary, the theory of optimal taxation suggests a tax rather than a
subsidy on housing. The welfare costs of the subsidy associated with distor-
tions in housing consumption and employment are estimated between 1.7 and
6.7 billion euro, depending on the elasticity of housing supply. As this elastic-
ity is probably small in the Netherlands due to strict spatial constraints, the
effects is probably closer to 6.7 billion euro. While this welfare gain is substan-
tial, political constraints tend to prevent the government from reaping these
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